Does cyber warfare limits and rules? Are they protected
against cyber attacks computers, networks and cyber infrastructure civilians?
The answer is yes, according asserts an international group of jurists and
military experts in Tallinn Manual, whose production document the ICRC has
participated as an observer. This document explains that the Tallinn Manual,
demonstrating the relevance of international humanitarian law in all armed
conflicts, represents an important step towards reducing human suffering.
Why cyber warfare is of concern to the ICRC?
The term "cyber war" has been used by several
people in reference to different situations. In the manual, "cyber
warfare" means the means and methods of warfare employed in cyber
operations that meet the threshold of armed conflict or are conducted in the
context of an armed conflict within the meaning of international law
humanitarian. For the ICRC, the wars of this kind are of concern because of the
vulnerability of cyber networks and humanitarian cost which may entail. When
computers or networks of a State are under attack, infiltration or a blockage,
civilians may be deprived of basic services such as drinking water supply,
healthcare and electricity. In case of shutdown of global positioning systems
(GPS), there may be civilian casualties, for example, if flight operations of
rescue helicopters providing vital services are interrupted. Dams, nuclear
power plants and air traffic control systems are also vulnerable in the event
of cyber attack, because of their dependence on computers. The degree of
interconnection of networks is such that it can be difficult to limit the
effects of an attack directed against part of the system without causing damage
to other equipment or without disturbing the whole. Welfare, health and even
countless lives of people could be affected. One of the tasks of the ICRC is to
remember, to all parties to the conflict, to be taken at all times, the
necessary precautionary measures to preserve the lives of civilians. The wars
have rules and limits that are applicable to the use of both cyber weapons as
rifles, artillery shells or missiles.
In manual recently published by a group of lawyers and
military experts, known as the Tallinn Manual provides that IHL applies in case
of cyber warfare and modalities of implementation of IHL rules in this area are
described.
We are pleased to note that experts reflect on the
consequences of cyber warfare and the law applicable in this case. The use of
cyber operations in armed conflicts can have devastating humanitarian
consequences. Trial ICRC is crucial to identify channels to limit the
humanitarian cost of cyber operations and, in particular, to reaffirm the
relevance of IHL when this new technology used in armed conflict. That is
exactly what experts assert the Tallinn Manual. The means and methods of
warfare evolve over time and is plain that not resemble those that existed when
the Geneva Conventions were drafted in 1949; However, IHL is still applicable
in all the activities that the parties conduct during armed conflict and must
be respected. You cannot rule out, however, that it may be necessary to
continue developing the right in order to provide sufficient protection to the
civilian population, as they evolve the cybernetic technologies or better
understand their humanitarian consequences. This issue should be settled by the
states.
While the Tallinn Manual is a non-binding document, prepared
by a group of experts, we hope to contribute usefully to encourage discussions
among States on this complex issue. We also desire that both states and
non-state armed groups ensure fulfillment with its international responsibilities
to resort cyber operations in armed conflicts. The ICRC will continue to provide
expert advice on IHL to address these challenges.
This does not mean that IHL is applicable in any cyber
operation or all is often called "cyber attacks" in everyday
language. IHL does not regulate cyber operations unrelated to a situation of
armed conflict. Businesses and governments are so exposed to cyber espionage,
cyber crimes and other malicious cyber activities as cyber attacks incumbent
IHL. While similar technical means can be used to protect infrastructure cyber
espionage or an attack, the right that governs these operations is different.
Therefore, it is essential to determine the circumstances in which it can be
considered a cyber operation is conducted during armed conflict or gives rise,
in itself, an armed conflict; so that it fits implement IHL.
Role of the ICRC in this process:
The ICRC participated as an observer in the deliberations of
the experts who wrote the Manual Tallinn, make it reflect, as far as possible,
existing provisions of IHL and maintain the protection that this branch of law
gives the victims of armed conflict. The 95 standards included in the manual
reflect the issues that were the subject of consensus among experts. The ICRC
generally consistent with the formulation of standards, with some exceptions:
for example, contrary to the findings of the ICRC study on customary IHL,
cultural goods are not included in the standard by which the ban retaliate
recalls war against certain persons and certain goods that enjoy special
protection. In the manual, helpful comments on standards are also presented,
including discrepancies between experts. For example, one of the differences
concerning the obligation of the parties to armed conflict to take all feasible
precautions to protect the effects of cyber attacks on the population and civilian
objects under their control; although in the comments of the manual states that
the scope of this standard be limited to international armed conflicts, the
ICRC considers that the obligation be applied in all types of armed conflict.
Main challenges of cyber war:
There is only one cyberspace, shared by civil and military
users, in which everything is interconnected. The main challenges lie in
ensuring that attacks are directed exclusively against military targets and
constantly ensure the preservation of life of the population and civilian
infrastructure. In addition, deaths among civilians and damage to civilian
objects that can cause incidentally should not be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated achieved through a cyber
attack. If you cannot meet these conditions, you should not attack. In this
respect, the manual is a timely reminder that for collateral damage means the
effects of both direct and indirect effects of an attack and should be taken
into account all planned indirect effect when the proportionality assessment is
carried out in phases planning and execution of an attack, an issue extremely
relevant in cyberspace. These issues highlight the importance of States to take
extreme caution when resorting to cyber attacks.
